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“My own behavior baﬄes me. For I ﬁnd myself not doing what I really want to do but
doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul
What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation
but is otherwise a “standard rational agent”? In earlier work, Gul–Pesendorfer [2001] use
a set betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini [2001] to those explainable via temptation. We argue that set betweenness
rules out plausible and interesting forms of temptation including some which may be
important in applications. We propose a pair of alternative axioms called DFC, desire
for commitment,a n dA I C ,approximate improvements are chosen. DFC characterizes
temptation as situations where given any set of alternatives, the agent prefers committing
herself to some particular item from the set rather than leaving herself the ﬂexibility of
choosing later. AIC is based on the idea that if adding an option to a menu improves
the menu, it is because that option is chosen under some circumstances. From this
interpretation, the axiom concludes that if an improvement is worse (as a commitment)
than some commitment from the menu, then the best commitment from the menu is
strictly preferred to facing the menu. We show that these axioms characterize a natural
generalization of the Gul–Pesendorfer representation.1 Introduction
What potentially observable behavior can we explain using the hypothesis that the agent
faces temptation but is otherwise a “standard rational agent”? We use the phrase
temptation–driven to refer to behavior explainable in this fashion.
By “temptation,” we mean that the agent has some current view of what actions she
would like to choose, but knows that at the time these choices are to be made, she will be
pulled by conﬂicting desires. For clarity, we refer to her current view of desirable actions
as her commitment preference since this describes the actions she would commit herself to
if possible. We interpret and frequently discuss this preference as the agent’s view of what
is normatively appropriate, though this is not a formal part of the model.1 We refer to the
future desires that may conﬂict with the commitment preference as temptations.W ev i e w
this conﬂict as independent of the set of feasible options in the sense that whether one
item is more tempting than another is independent of what other options are available.
Thus we do impose a certain structure on the way temptation aﬀects the agent. Also, we
allow the possibility that the extent or nature of temptation is random, but do not allow
similar randomness regarding what is normatively preferred. While there is undoubtedly
an element of arbitrariness in this modeling choice, we choose to rule out uncertainty
about what is normatively preferred to separate temptation–driven behavior from the
desire for ﬂexibility which such uncertainty would generate. We retain uncertainty about
temptation for two reasons.2 First, as we will see, some behavior which is very intuitive
as an outcome of temptation is (unexpectedly) diﬃcult to explain without uncertainty
about temptation. Second, we believe uncertainty about temptations is likely to be
important in applications.3
Our approach builds on earlier work by Gul–Pesendorfer [2001] (henceforth GP) and
Dekel–Lipman–Rustichini [2001] (DLR). DLR consider a rather general model of prefer-
ences over menus, from which choice is made at a later date. (A menu can be interpreted
either literally or as an action which aﬀects subsequent opportunities.) DLR show that
preferences over menus can be used to identify an agent’s subjective beliefs regarding her
future tastes and behavior. The set of preferences considered by DLR can be interpreted
as allowing for a desire for ﬂexibility, concerns over temptation, or both considerations,
as well as preferences with entirely diﬀerent interpretations.4
GP were the ﬁrst to use preferences over menus to study temptation. To see the
1See Noor [2006a] for a critique of such interpretations.
2Also, allowing uncertainty about normative preferences poses severe identiﬁcation problems. See
Section 6 for details.
3It is true that uncertainty about what is normatively appropriate may also be important in appli-
cations as well; see Amador, Werning, and Angeletos [2006].
4For examples of diﬀerent motivations, see Sarver [2005] or Ergin and Sarver [2005].
1intuition for how this works, recall that temptation refers to desires to deviate from
the commitment preference. The commitment preference is naturally identiﬁed as the
preference over singleton menus, since such menus correspond exactly to commitments
to particular choices. Thus temptation can be identiﬁed by seeing how preferences over
non–singleton menus diﬀer from what would be implied by the commitment preferences if
there were no temptation. That is, if {a} { b}, so the agent prefers a commitment of a to
a commitment of b, then if there were no temptation (or other “nonstandard” motives),
we would have {a,b}∼{ a} since she would choose a from {a,b}. With temptation,
though, {a} may be strictly preferred to {a,b}.
Using this intuition, GP focus on temptation alone by adding a set betweenness axiom
to the DLR model. As we explain in more detail in subsequent sections, this axiom has
the implication that temptation is one–dimensional in the sense that for any menu,
temptation only aﬀects the agent through the “most tempting” item on the menu. This
rules out many intuitive kinds of temptation–driven behavior. For example, it rules out
uncertainty about temptation where the agent cannot be sure which item on a menu will
be the most tempting one or how strong the temptation will be. We give examples in
Section 3 to illustrate such possibilities.
We believe that uncertainty about temptation is important for applications. In reality,
an agent cannot easily “ﬁne tune” her commitments. That is, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a way
to commit oneself to some exact course of action without allowing any alternative possi-
bilities. Instead, real commitments tend to be costly actions which alter one’s incentives
to engage in “desired” or “undesired” future behaviors. Casual observation suggests that
such commitments often involve overcommitment (spending more ex ante to commit to
a certain behavior than turns out ex post to be necessary) or undercommitment (ﬁnding
out ex post that the change in one’s incentives was not suﬃcient to achieve the desired
eﬀect). Neither phenomenon seems consistent with a model without uncertainty.
Similarly, much of the real complexity of achieving commitment comes from the mul-
tidimensional character of temptation. To see the point, ﬁrst suppose the only possible
temptation is overspending on current consumption. In this case, the agent can avoid
temptation by committing herself to a minimum level of savings. Now suppose there are
other temptations that may strike as well, such as the temptation to be lazy and avoid
dealing with needed home repairs or other time–consuming expenditures. In this case,
the commitment to saving may worsen the agent’s ability to deal with other temptations.
As GP argue, it was natural for them to begin the study of temptation by narrowing to
a particularly simple version of the phenomenon. Our goal is to use the DLR framework
to build on their analysis and carry out the logical next step in the study of temptation,
namely identifying the broadest possible set of temptation–driven behavior.
We explore how to model temptation along so as to be able to study behavior that
2follows from this feature. Just as it is insightful to distinguish between risk and ambiguity,
it is instructive to identify behavior due to temptation. Naturally, other factors may lead
to similar behavior and we cannot say that the behavior we identify proves the agent
was tempted, only that it is consistent with temptation. But our results do specify
what behavior is not a consequence of temptation (as we deﬁne it). Some of our results
also characterize speciﬁc forms of temptation, such as uncertainty about the strength of
temptation. In the opposite direction, one could extend the form of temptation to allow
temptation to depend not only on the tempting item but on the whole set of available
items, which would allow for even richer behavior than what we identify.
After simplifying by means of a ﬁniteness axiom, we carry out this next step by adding
a pair of axioms to DLR. We show that these axioms characterize a natural generalization
of the GP representation. The ﬁrst axiom, DFC or desire for commitment,s i m p l ys a y s
that given any set of alternatives, the agent at least weakly prefers to commit herself
to some option from this set rather than retaining the ﬂexibility to choose from the set
later. In this sense, DFC is exactly the statement that there is no value to ﬂexibility but
the agent may fear being tempted to choose “inappropriately.”
The second axiom, AIC or approximate improvements are chosen, identiﬁes a cir-
cumstance in which the preference for commitment is strict. The key to the axiom is
what additional implications we deduce from the fact that adding an option, say β,t o
am e n ux improves the menu. We interpret such an improvement as saying that β is
chosen under some conditions. Hence, we draw the conclusion that if β is worse than the
normatively best α ∈ x, then the agent strictly prefers commitment to α over facing the
menu. (The axiom asks for this to holds for perturbations well.) Given the interpretation
of the axioms and the intuitive nature of the representation they generate, we conclude
that DFC and AIC yield a natural way to identify from the large set considered by DLR
those preferences which are temptation–driven.
We also give some special cases of the main representation and the additional axioms
which correspond to these. We explain how these special cases have natural interpreta-
tions as restrictions on the kinds of temptation faced by the agent.
As brieﬂy mentioned above, our analysis is based on a simpliﬁed version of DLR,
the development of which is another contribution of the present paper. To maintain a
uniﬁed focus, the text focuses almost entirely on the issue of temptation and the Appendix
contains a complete explanation of how we add a ﬁniteness requirement to DLR.
In the next section, we present the basic model and state our research goals more
precisely. In the process, we sketch the relevant results in DLR and GP. In Section 3, we
give examples to motivate the issues and illustrate the kinds of representations in which
we are interested. In Section 4, we give representation results. Because DFC is a simpler
axiom than AIC and because it is a convenient step in the analysis, we also state the
3representation generated by adding only this axiom. Section 5 contains characterizations
of some special cases. In Section 6, we brieﬂy discuss directions for further research.
2 The Model
Let B be a ﬁnite set of prizes and let Δ(B) denote the set of probability distributions on
B. A typical subset of Δ(B) will be referred to as a menu and denoted x,w h i l eat y p i c a l
element of Δ(B), a lottery, will be denoted by β. The agent has a preference relation  
on the set of closed nonempty subsets of Δ(B) which is denoted X.
The basic representation on which we build is what we will call a ﬁnite additive EU
representation. This adds a ﬁnite state requirement to what DLR called an additive EU
representation. Formally, we say that a utility function over lotteries, U :Δ ( B) → R is





for all β (where U(b) is the utility of the degenerate lottery with probability 1 on b).
Deﬁnition 1 A ﬁnite additive EU representation is a pair of ﬁnite collections of expected–













DLR, as modiﬁed in the corrigendum (Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini, and Sarver [2005],
henceforth DLRS), characterize this class of representations without the ﬁniteness re-
quirement. Theorem 6 in the appendix extends DLR and DLRS by characterizing the
set of preferences with a ﬁnite additive EU representation.5
DLR interpret the diﬀerent utility functions over Δ(B) as diﬀerent states of the
world, referring to the I states corresponding to the wi’s as positive states and J states
5In addition to ﬁniteness, the ﬁnite additive EU representation diﬀer from DLR’s additive EU repre-
sentation in three respects. First, DLR included a nonemptiness requirement as part of the deﬁnition of
an additive EU representation. Consequently, their axiom diﬀer from those of Theorem 6 by including
a nontriviality axiom. Second, DLR required that none of the utility functions be redundant. Third, in
the inﬁnite case, it is not without loss of generality to have equal weights on all the wi’s and vj’s, so the
representation in DLR also speciﬁes a measure on the (inﬁnite) index sets I and J.
4corresponding to the vj’s as negative states. To understand this interpretation most
simply, suppose there are no negative states — i.e., J = 0. Then it seems natural to
interpret the wi’s as diﬀerent utility functions the agent might have at some later date
when she will choose from the menu she picks today. At the point when she will make
this choice, she will know which of these wi’s is her utility function and, naturally, will
choose the item from the menu which maximizes this utility. Her ex ante evaluation of
the menu is the expected value of the maximum. If the wi’s are equally likely, we obtain
the value above.6 This interpretation was originally oﬀered by Kreps [1979, 1992] who
ﬁrst considered preferences over sets as a model of preference for ﬂexibility. Obviously,
though, the presence of the negative states makes this interpretation awkward.
One way to reach a clearer understanding of this representation, then, is to rule out
the negative states. DLR show that Kreps’ monotonicity axiom does this.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity) If x ⊂ x ,t h e nx    x.
It is straightforward to combine results in DLR with Theorem 6 to show the following.7
Observation 1 Assume the preference   has a ﬁnite additive EU representation. Then
  has a representation with J =0if and only if it satisﬁes monotonicity.
Intuitively, monotonicity says that the agent always values ﬂexibility. Such an agent
either is not concerned about temptation or, at least, values ﬂexibility so highly as to
outweigh such considerations. In this case, the ﬁnite additive EU representation is easy
to interpret as describing a forward–looking agent with beliefs about her possible future
needs.
GP’s approach provides an alternative interpretation of the ﬁnite additive EU repre-
sentation by imposing a diﬀerent restriction on that class of preferences. They recognized
that temptation and self–control could be studied using this sets of lotteries framework if
one does not impose monotonicity. If the agent anticipates being tempted in the future
to consume something she currently doesn’t want herself to consume, this is revealed by
a preference for commitment, not ﬂexibility. GP’s [2001] representation theorem diﬀers
from Observation 1 by replacing monotonicity with an axiom they call set betweenness.
6The interpretation of the wi’s as equally likely is only for intuition. As is standard with state
dependent utility, we can change the probabilities in essentially arbitrary ways and rescale the wi’s to
leave the overall utility unchanged. Hence the probabilities cannot be identiﬁed. See, however, the third
comment in the preceding footnote.
7If   has a representation with J = 0, it will also have other representations with J>0. To see
this, note that we can add a vj satisfying vj(β)=k for all β to any representation and not change the
preference being represented. This is why DLR imposed a requirement that no “redundant” states are
included. For the purposes of this paper, it is simpler to allow redundancy.
5Axiom 2 (Set Betweenness) If x   y,t h e nx   x ∪ y   y.
To understand this axiom, consider a dieting agent’s choice of a restaurant for lunch
where x, y,a n dx∪y are the menus at the three possible restaurants. Suppose x consists
only of a single healthy food item, say broccoli, while y consists only of some fattening
food item, say french fries. Since the agent is dieting, presumably x   y.G i v e nt h i s ,h o w
should the agent rank the menu x ∪ y relative to the other two? A natural hypothesis
is that the third restaurant would lie between the other two in the agent’s ranking. It
would be better than the menu with only french fries since the agent might choose broccoli
given the option. On the other hand, x ∪ y would be worse than the menu with only
broccoli since the agent might succumb to temptation or, even if she didn’t succumb,
might suﬀer from the costs of maintaining self–control in the face of the temptation.
Hence x   x ∪ y   y.
The relevant representation in GP is the following.
Deﬁnition 2 A self–control representation is a pair of functions (u,v), u :Δ ( B) → R,








It is easy to see that this is a ﬁnite additive EU representation with one positive state
and one negative state where w1 = u + v and v1 = v. Thus it comes as no surprise
that the axioms GP use for this representation include those we use in Theorem 6 to
characterize ﬁnite additive EU representations.8 Hence we can paraphrase their result as
Theorem 1 (GP, Theorem 1)   has a self–control representation if and only if it has
a ﬁnite additive EU representation and satisﬁes set betweenness.
To interpret GP’s representation, note that u represents the commitment preference
— the preference over singletons — as VGP({β})=u(β) for any β. For any menu x and









8Speciﬁcally, their axioms are the same as those we use in Theorem 6 except that they have set
betweenness instead of our ﬁniteness axiom. One can show that set betweenness implies ﬁniteness. It is
worth noting that they consider a more general setting than us in that they assume B is compact, not
ﬁnite.
6Intuitively, c is the foregone utility according to v from choosing β from x instead of
choosing optimally according to v. It is easy to see that
VGP(x)=m a x
β∈x [u(β) − c(β,x)].
In this form, it is natural to interpret c as the cost of the self–control needed to choose
β from x. Given this, v is naturally interpreted as the temptation utility since it is what
determines the self–control cost.
To interpret these results, consider the set of preferences with a ﬁnite additive EU rep-
resentation. Intuitively, the subset of these preferences which are monotonic corresponds
to those agents who value ﬂexibility but are not aﬀected by temptation. It seems natu-
ral to call such preferences ﬂexibility–driven, as both the axiom and the representation
it generates seem to describe such an agent. In other words, deﬁning ﬂexibility–driven
preferences as those which can be explained by ﬂexibility considerations alone, it seems
natural to conclude that monotonicity characterizes these preferences.
Analogously, we refer to preferences which can be explained solely by a concern about
temptation as temptation–driven. It seems natural to say that the preferences that satisfy
set betweenness are temptation–driven preferences. However, set betweenness does not
appear to be as complete a statement of “temptation–driven preferences” as monotonicity
is for “ﬂexibility–driven.” In fact, it is not hard to give examples of behavior which
seems temptation–driven but which violates set betweenness. This suggests that set
betweenness is stronger than a restriction to temptation–driven preferences. Our goal in
this paper is to identify and give a representation theorem for the full class of temptation–
driven preferences.
3 Motivating Examples and Some Alternative Rep-
resentations
In this section, we give two examples to illustrate our argument that set betweenness is
stronger than a restriction to temptation–driven preferences. We also use these examples
to suggest other representations that may be of interest.
Example 1.
Consider a dieting agent who would like to commit herself to eating only broccoli.
There are two kinds of snacks available: chocolate cake and high–fat potato chips. Let b
denote the broccoli, c the chocolate cake, and p the potato chips. The following ranking
seems quite natural:
{b} { b,c},{b,p} { b,c,p}.
7That is, if the agent has both broccoli and a fattening snack available, the temptation
of the snack will lower her utility, so {b,c} and {b,p} are both worse than {b}.I f s h e
has broccoli and both fattening snacks available, she is still worse oﬀ since two snacks are
harder to resist than one.
Two snacks could be worse than one for at least two reasons. First, it could be that
the agent is unsure what kind of temptation will strike. If the agent craves a salty snack,
then she may be able to control herself easily if only the chocolate cake is available as an
alternative to broccoli. Similarly, if she is in the mood for a sweet snack, she may be able
to control herself if only the potato chips are available. But if she has both available,
she is more likely to be hit by a temptation she cannot avoid. Second, even if she resists
temptation, the psychological cost of self–control seems likely to be higher in the presence
of two snacks than in the presence of one.9
This preference violates set betweenness. Note that {b,c,p} is strictly worse than
{b,c} and {b,p} even though it is the union of these two sets. Hence set betweenness
implies that two temptations can never be worse than each of the temptations separately.
In GP, temptation is one–dimensional in the sense that any menu has a most tempting
option and only this option is relevant to the self–control costs.
It is not hard to give generalizations of GP’s representation that can model either of
the two reasons stated above for two snacks to be worse than one. To see this, deﬁne



































β∈x [u(β) − ci(β,x)].
Intuitively, the agent doesn’t know whether the temptation that will strike is the one
described by v1 and cost function c1 (where she is most tempted by the potato chips)
9GP [2001, 1408–1409] mention this possibility as one reason why set betweenness may be violated.
8or v2 and cost function c2 (where she is most tempted by the chocolate cake) and gives
probability 1/2 to each possibility. It is easy to verify that this gives V1({b})=3 ,
V1({b,c})=V1({b,p})=3 /2, and V1({b,c,p}) = 0, yielding the ordering suggested
above.

















− v1(β) − v2(β),
so that V2(x)=m a x β∈x[u(β) − c(β,x)]. It is not hard to see that this cost function has
the property that resisting two temptations is harder than resisting either separately.
More speciﬁcally, it is easy to verify that V2({b})=3 ,V2({b,c})=V2({b,p})=−1, and
V ({b,c,p})=−5, again yielding the ordering suggested above.
We note that there is one odd feature of this representation. If the agent succumbs
to either temptation, he still suﬀers a cost associated with the temptation he does not
consume. That is, the self–control cost associated with choosing either snack from the
menu {b,c,p} is 6, not zero. Arguably, it should be feasible for the agent to succumb to
temptation and incur no self–control cost. We return to this issue in the conclusion.
Example 2.
Consider again the dieting agent facing multiple temptations, but now suppose the two
snacks available are high fat chocolate ice cream (i) and low fat chocolate frozen yogurt
(y). In this case, it seems natural that the agent might have the following rankings:
{b,y} { y} and {b,i,y} { b,i}.
In other words, the agent prefers a chance of sticking to her diet to committing herself to
violating it so {b,y} { y}. Also, if the agent cannot avoid having ice cream available,
it’s better to also have the low fat frozen yogurt around. If so, then when temptation
strikes, the agent may be able to resolve her hunger for chocolate in a less fattening way.
Again, GP cannot have this. To see why this cannot occur in their model, note that
VGP({b,y})=m a x {u(b)+v(b),u(y)+v(y)}−max{v(b),v(y)}
while VGP({y})=u(y)=u(y)+v(y) − v(y). Obviously, max{v(b),v(y)}≥v(y). So
VGP({b,y}) >V GP({y})r e q u i r e sm a x {u(b)+v(b),u(y)+v(y)} >u (y)+v(y)o ru(b)+
v(b) >u (y)+v(y). Given this,
max{u(b)+v(b),u(i)+v(i),u(y)+v(y)} =m a x {u(b)+v(b),u(i)+v(i)}.
9Since
max{v(b),v(i),v(y)}≥max{v(b),v(i)},
we get VGP({b,i,y}) ≤ VGP({b,i}). That is, we must have {b,i} { b,i,y}.10
To see this more intuitively, note that {b,y} { y} says that adding b improves the
menu {y}. As discussed in the introduction, we interpret this as saying that the agent
considers it possible that she would choose b from the menu {b,y}, an interpretation we
share with GP. However, in GP, the agent has no uncertainty about temptation, so this
statement means she knows she will deﬁnitely choose b from {b,y}. Consequently, she
will deﬁnitely not choose y whenever b is available.11 Hence the only possible eﬀect of
adding y to a menu which contains b is to increase self–control costs. Hence GP require
{b,i,y} { b,i}.
This intuition suggests that uncertainty about temptation is critical to rationalizing
this preference. The following simple generalization of GP to incorporate uncertainty



















Intuitively, there is a probability of 1/2 that the agent avoids temptation and chooses
according to the commitment preference u. With probability 1/2, the agent is tempted,
however, and has a preference of the form characterized by GP. This gives V3({b,y})=
5 > 4=V3({y})a n dV3({b,i,y})=5> 3=V3({b,i}), in line with the intuitive story.
The three representations used in these examples share certain features in common.
First, all are ﬁnite additive EU representations. While we do not wish to argue that the
axioms needed for such a representation are innocuous, it is not obvious that temptation
should require some violation of them (though see Section 6). Second, in all cases, the
representation is written in terms of the utility functions for the negative states and u,
the commitment utility. Equivalently, we can write the representation in terms of the
commitment utility and various possible cost functions where these costs are generated
from diﬀerent possible temptations.
10This conclusion does not follow from set betweenness alone. It is easy to give examples of pref-
erences which satisfy set betweenness and avoid this problem but which do not have an additive EU
representation.
11Note that this conclusion relies on the assumption that temptation does not lead the agent to violate
independence of irrelevant alternatives. That is, we are assuming that if the agent would choose b over
y from one set, she would never choose y when b is available. See Section 6 for further discussion.
10Intuitively, the diﬀerent negative states from the additive EU representation identify
the diﬀerent temptations. The various positive states then correspond to diﬀerent ways
these temptations might combine to aﬀect the agent. However, all the positive states
share a common view of what is “normatively best” as embodied in u.I n t h i s s e n s e ,
there is no uncertainty about “true preferences” and hence no “true” value to ﬂexibility,
only uncertainty about temptation.
A general representation with these properties is







where qi > 0 for all i,
 















where u and each vj is an expected–utility function.
Note that
 
i qi = 1 implies that VT({β})=u(β), so u is the commitment utility.
Intuitively, we can think of each ci as a cost of self–control, describing one way the
agent might be aﬀected by temptation. In this interpretation, qi gives the probability
that temptation takes the form described by ci.
We can think of this as generalizing GP in two directions. First, more than one
temptation can aﬀect the agent at a time. That is, the cost of self–control may depend
on more than one temptation utility. Second, the agent is uncertain which temptation
or temptations will aﬀect her.
We also study one less interpretable representation which is useful as an intermediate
step.
Deﬁnition 4 A weak temptation representation is a function Vw representing   such
that
Vw(x)=










where qi > 0 for all i,
 















11where u and each vj is an expected–utility function.
Obviously, a temptation representation is a special case of a weak temptation repre-
sentation where I  = I.
As we will see, the weak temptation representation makes a natural midway point
between the temptation representation and the ﬁnite additive EU representation. On
the other hand, it lacks the natural interpretation of the temptation representation.12
4R e s u l t s
The following axiom seems to be a natural part of a deﬁnition of temptation–driven.
Axiom 3 (DFC: Desire for Commitment) Ap r e f e r e n c e  satisﬁes DFC if for every
x,t h e r ei ss o m eα ∈ x such that {α} x.
Intuitively, this axiom seems to be a necessary condition to say that a preference is
temptation–driven. The axiom says that there is no value to ﬂexibility associated with
x, only potential costs due to temptation leading the agent to choose some point worse
for her diet than α.
On the other hand, this axiom only says that ﬂexibility is not valued. It does not
say anything about when commitment is valued. The second axiom identiﬁes a key
circumstance in which commitment is strictly valuable, that is, when there is some α ∈ x
such that {α} x.
To get some intuition for the axiom we will propose, consider the following example,
similar to Example 2, where the three goods are broccoli (b), low fat frozen yogurt (y),
and high fat ice cream (i). Assume that {b} { y} { i}, so that broccoli is best for the
12One way to interpret the weak temptation representation is that it is a limiting case of temptation
representations. To see this, ﬁx a weak temptation representation with I>I   and any ε ∈ (0,1).
We can deﬁne a (strict) temptation representation with I “states” by shifting ε of the probability on
the ﬁrst I  states to the remaining I − I  states, adjusting the cost functions at the same time. More
speciﬁcally, deﬁne ˆ qi = qi − ε/(I − I )f o ri ≤ I  and ˆ qi = ε/(I − I )f o ri = I  +1 ,...,I.F o r ε>0
suﬃciently small, ˆ qi > 0 for all i.F o ri ≤ I ,l e tˆ ci = ci.F o ri = I  +1 ,...,I, deﬁne new cost functions
ˆ ci =( 1 /ˆ qi)ci. Consider the payoﬀ to any menu as computed by this temptation representation minus
the payoﬀ as computed by the original weak representation. It is easy to see that this diﬀerence is
proportional to ε and so converges to 0 as ε ↓ 0. In this sense, we have constructed a sequence of
temptation representations converging to the weak representation.
12agent’s diet and ice cream is worst. As we argued earlier, it seems plausible that adding
y to the menu {b,i} improves the menu since y is a useful compromise when tempted.
So assume that {b,i,y} { b,i}. As suggested in the introduction and as we argue at
greater length below, if adding an item to a menu improves the menu, this should be
interpreted as implying that the added item is sometimes chosen from the menu. That
is, we should conclude from {b,i,y} { b,i} that y is sometimes chosen from the menu
{b,i,y}. Hence with this menu, the agent will sometimes break her diet, choosing y
instead of b. Consequently, she should strictly prefer committing herself to the broccoli.
That is, we should conclude {b} { b,i,y}. In addition, if y is sometimes chosen over
b and i, it should also be sometimes chosen from the menu {b,y}. Thus the dieter
sometimes breaks her diet with this menu too, implying {b} { b,y}. These implications
are the content of our next axiom when applied to this example: since adding y improves
the menu {b,i}, we require that {b} is strictly preferred to both {b,i,y} and {b,y}.
More generally, suppose we have a menu x with the property that adding β to x
strictly improves the menu for the agent in the sense that x ∪{ β} x.( S o t h i n k o f
x = {b,i} and β = y.) In such a case, we say β is an improvement for x.H o ws h o u l dw e
interpret this property? In principle, there are many reasons why adding an element to
a menu might improve the menu. For example, a menu may be “prettier” with certain
lines added to it. An agent may simply like having options, even knowing she would
never choose them. More related to temptation, adding a particularly disgusting dessert
option might make it easier for a dieter to avoid dessert since reading the menu makes
dessert unappetizing.
Our goal is to characterize agents who face temptation but are otherwise “standard
rational agents.” As such, we consider an agent for whom the items on a menu have a
certain appeal which is menu–independent, an appeal which may create internal conﬂicts
which the agent has to resolve. Thus we assume that the normative appeal and the
extent of temptation of any given item is independent of the other items in the menu.
In light of this, it seems natural to assume that adding an element to a menu does
not make it easier to choose other elements or create value separately from choice (as
in the case of a “prettier” menu). That is, the only eﬀect adding an unchosen element
can have is to increase self–control costs. With this principle, we interpret x ∪{ β} x
as saying that the agent at least considers it possible that she would choose β from the
menu x ∪{ β}. We emphasize that this is only an interpretation, not a theorem. We are
arguing that our deﬁnition of temptation strongly suggests this interpretation, not that
it “proves” it.13,14
13Gul and Pesendorfer [2005] also argue for this interpretation of β improving x.
14It is diﬃcult if not impossible to draw deﬁnitive conclusions about choices the agent would make
from a menu based on preferences over menus. At best, we can interpret preferences over menus as
suggesting that the agent perceives her future choice in a particular way. For example, consider an
agent whose preference over menus has a temptation representation. We interpret the representation as
13Under this interpretation of the preference, what else should be true? Suppose α is
the best item for her diet in x (i.e., is optimal according to the commitment preference)
and {α} { β}. (In terms of the example, think of α = b.) So α ∈ x is strictly better
for the agent’s diet than β and yet she considers it possible she would choose β from the
menu x ∪{ β}. Thus the agent must consider it possible that her choice from the menu
x∪{β} is inconsistent with her commitment preference. Hence she should strictly prefer
committing herself to α rather than facing the menu x∪{β}.T h a ti s ,c o m m i t m e n tm u s t
be strictly valuable in the sense that {α} x ∪{ β}.
Similarly, consider some x  ⊆ x. (Think of x  = {b}.) If the agent considers it possible
that she would choose β from x ∪{ β}, surely she also considers it possible she would
choose β from x  ∪{ β}.15 Again, if the best α ∈ x  for her diet satisﬁes {α} { β},w e
should conclude that the agent would strictly prefer the commitment {α} to facing the
menu x  ∪{ β}.
To summarize, we interpret x ∪{ β} x to mean that β is sometimes chosen from
x∪{β} and hence from x ∪{β} for any x  ⊆ x.I ft h eb e s tα ∈ x  satisﬁes {α} { β},t h i s
implies that the agent does not always choose from x ∪{β} according to her commitment
preferences. Therefore, commitment is strictly valuable for x  ∪{ β} in the sense that
{α} x ∪{β}. Since the key to this intuition is that x∪{β} x implies β is sometimes
chosen from x∪{β}, we summarize this by saying improvements are (sometimes) chosen.
The axiom we need is slightly stronger. In addition to applying to any β which is
an improvement for x, it applies to any β which is an approximate improvement for x.
Because of this, we call the axiom AIC, approximate improvements are chosen. Formally,
saying that the agent assigns probability qi to being tempted according to cost function ci. It seems
natural, then, to say that if the agent has menu x, then with probability qi, the agent will choose a β ∈ x
which maximizes u(β) −ci(β,x). However, this conclusion is purely an interpretation of the model, not
a theorem which can be proven. The only primitive in the model is a preference over menus, so we
have no information about choice from the menu with which to conﬁrm this interpretation. GP resolve
this problem by extending the preference over menus to menu–choice pairs, but this approach has a
severe problem. To state it most simply, let x = {a,b,c} and let  ∗ denote this extended preference.
Suppose (x,a)  ∗ (x,b)  ∗ (x,c). GP interpret this to say that a is chosen from menu x. While this
conclusion seems natural, how are we to interpret (x,b)  ∗ (x,c)? There is no choice which can reveal
this preference to us. If x is the set of choices available, neither b nor c would be chosen by the agent.
Asking the agent to compare (x,b)t o( x,c) is like asking the agent which she prefers: being oﬀered x
but forced to choose b or being oﬀered x but forced to choose c.I n w h a t s e n s e i s x the available set
if the agent must choose something other than a from the set? Because of these problems, we avoid
hypotheses on choice from menus to maximum extent possible.
15As an aside, we remark that this argument relies on a kind of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
That is, we are arguing that if β is chosen from a set in some situation, then it is chosen from any subset
containing it in that same situation. As we discuss in Section 6, this is not necessarily an appropriate
assumption for modeling temptation.
14deﬁne β to be an approximate improvement for x if
β ∈ cl({β
  | x ∪{ β
 } x})
where cl denotes closure. Let B(x)d e n o t et h es e to fb e s tc o m m i t m e n t si nx.T h a ti s ,
B(x)={α ∈ x |{ α} { β}, ∀β ∈ x}.
Then we have
Axiom 4 (AIC: Approximate Improvements are Chosen) If β is an approximate
improvement for x, x  ⊆ x,a n dα ∈ B(x ) satisﬁes {α} { β},t h e n{α} x  ∪{ β}.
Theorem 2   has a temptation representation if and only if it has a ﬁnite additive EU
representation and satisﬁes DFC and AIC.
As mentioned earlier, the weak temptation representation, while not as interpretable
as the temptation representation, is a natural intermediate point between the ﬁnite ad-
ditive EU representation and the temptation representation. More speciﬁcally, in the
course of proving Theorem 2, we also show
Theorem 3   has a weak temptation representation if and only if it has a ﬁnite additive
EU representation and satisﬁes DFC.
5S p e c i a l C a s e s
In this section, we characterize the preferences corresponding to two special cases of
temptation representations. Speciﬁcally, we characterize the “no uncertainty” represen-
tation V2 in (1) of Example 1 and the “uncertain strength of temptation” representation
V3 in (2) of Example 2. These special cases are of interest in part because of the way
the required conditions relate to GP’s set betweenness axiom. Also, these special cases
can be thought of as narrowing the “allowed” forms of temptation in easily interpretable
ways.


































Note that this representation diﬀers from the general temptation representation by as-
suming that I = 1 — that is, that the agent knows exactly which temptations will
aﬀect her. Hence we call this a no–uncertainty representation. This representation, then,
generalizes GP only by allowing the agent to be aﬀected by multiple temptations.
If the preference has a ﬁnite additive EU representation with one positive state, then
we can rewrite it in the form of a no–uncertainty representation by a generalization of the
change of variables discussed in Section 2. Speciﬁcally, suppose we have a representation
of the form








The commitment utility u is deﬁned by u(β)=V ({β})=w1(β) −
 
j vj(β). Hence we
can change variables to rewrite V in the form of VNU.
The no–uncertainty representation turns out to correspond to a particular half of set
betweenness. Speciﬁcally,
Axiom 5 (Positive Set Betweenness)   satisﬁes positive set betweenness if when-
ever x   y, we have x   x ∪ y.
For future use, we deﬁne the other half similarly:
Axiom 6 (Negative Set Betweenness)   satisﬁes negative set betweenness if when-
ever x   y, we have x ∪ y   y.
The following lemma characterizes the implication of positive set betweenness.16
Lemma 1 Suppose   has a ﬁnite additive EU representation. Then it has such a rep-
resentation with one positive state if and only if it satisﬁes positive set betweenness.
16See also Kopylov [2005] who gives a generalization to I positive states and J negative states.
16To see the intuition, suppose   satisﬁes positive set betweenness and suppose x   y.
Then x ∪ y is bounded “on the positive side” in the sense that x   x ∪ y. Hence the
ﬂexibility of being able to choose between x and y has only negative consequences. That
is, the ﬂexibility to choose between x and y cannot be better than x, though it can,
conceivably, be worse than y. Hence the uncertainty the agent faces regarding her tastes
is entirely on the negative side. This implies that there may be multiple negative states
but can only be one positive one.
Using the change of variables discussed above, this lemma obviously yields
Theorem 4   has a no–uncertainty representation if and only if it has a ﬁnite state
additive EU representation and satisﬁes positive set betweenness.
One can modify the proof of Lemma 1 in obvious ways to show
Lemma 2 Suppose   has a ﬁnite state additive EU representation. Then it has such a
representation with one negative state if and only if it satisﬁes negative set betweenness.
Theorem 1 is obviously a corollary to Lemmas 1 and 2.
A second special case takes Lemma 2 as its starting point. This representation has one
negative state but many positive states which diﬀer only in the strength of temptation
in that state. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne an uncertain strength of temptation representation





β∈x [u(β) − γic(β,x)]
where qi > 0 for all i and
 
i qi =1a n d
c(β,x)=[ m a x
β ∈x
v(β
 )] − v(β).
In this representation, the temptation is always v, but the strength of the temptation
(as measured by γi) is random. The probability that the strength of the temptation is
γi is given by qi. In a sense, this representation allows uncertainty but to the minimum
possible extent.
We have
Theorem 5   has an uncertain strength of temptation representation if and only if it has
a ﬁnite state additive EU representation and satisﬁes DFC and negative set betweenness.
176C o n c l u s i o n
There are several interesting issues left to explore. In the previous section, we gave two
specializations of the general representation to more speciﬁc assumptions on the nature
of temptation. Naturally, there are numerous other possible directions of interest along
similar lines.
One case of particular interest addresses a potential concern mentioned in the dis-
cussion of Example 1. Our general representation allows cost functions that depend on













where Ji need not be a singleton. In general, such a representation will have the property
that there is no choice the agent can make which will reduce ci to 0. One might prefer
to assume that if the agent gives in to temptation, the self–control cost is zero. But if Ji
is not a singleton and the vj’s are maximized at diﬀerent points in x, this is impossible,
arguably implying that these representations include considerations other than tempta-
tion such as regret.17 This motivates considering a restriction to what we call a simple
representation, a temptation representation with the property that Ji is a singleton for all
i. We conjecture that   has a simple representation if and only if it has a ﬁnite additive
EU representation and satisﬁes weak set betweenness:
Axiom 7 (Weak Set Betweenness) If {α} { β} for all α ∈ x and β ∈ y,t h e n
x   x ∪ y   y.
Another issue which may be of interest is introducing uncertainty about what is
normatively desirable as well as about temptation. To some extent, however, this problem
is too easily solved. More speciﬁcally, any ﬁnite additive EU representation can be written
as a temptation representation with uncertainty about normative preferences. To see the












Partition the set {1,...,J} into I sets, J1,...,J I in any fashion. Use this partition to















17We thank Todd Sarver for this observation.
18just as in the deﬁnition of a temptation representation. Deﬁne ui so that ui +
 
j∈Ji vj =







Interpreting the I states as equally likely, this looks like a temptation representation
where the normative preference, ui, varies with i. On the other hand, it is not clear what
justiﬁes interpreting the ui’s as various possible normative preferences. In our temptation
representation, u represents the commitment preference and thus is identiﬁed. Note that
the inability to identify the ui’s above leads to a more general inability to identify which
temptations are relevant in what states since the partition above was arbitrary.
This observation points to another important direction to extend the current model.
Our assumption that the normative preference is state independent allows the possibility
of identifying at least some aspects of the representation in the sense that these aspects
are uniquely determined (up to some transformation). It is not hard to show that the
representation is identiﬁed in a natural sense if, for example, the u and the various vj’s are
aﬃnely independent in the sense that these functions (viewed as vectors in RK where K is
the number of pure outcomes) and the vector of 1’s are linearly independent. With such
identiﬁcation, it is possible to consider how changes in preferences correspond to changes
in the representation (i.e., analogs to the correspondence between increased willingness
to undertake risk and a lower Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion). For example, DLR
show that one preference has an additive EU representation with a larger set of negative
states than another if and only if it values commitment more in a certain sense. Since
temptation representations have more structure than additive EU representations, there
may be new comparisons of interest.
Finally, our characterization of behavior which can be explained by temptation is
carried out within the set of preferences which have a ﬁnite additive EU representation,
a set characterized in Theorem 6 in the appendix. While some of the axioms required
seem unrelated to issues of temptation, two of the necessary conditions, continuity and
independence (see appendix for deﬁnitions), arguably eliminate some temptation–related
behavior. Hence it may be useful to consider weaker forms of these axioms.
Regarding continuity, GP show that at least one common model of temptation requires





where Bv(x)i st h es e to fv maximizers in x. Intuitively, the agent expects her choice
from the menu to be determined by her later self with utility function v, where her later
self breaks ties in favor of the current self. As GP demonstrate, in the absence of very
speciﬁc relationships between u and v, such a representation cannot satisfy continuity.
19Regarding independence, there are several temptation–related issues which may lead
to violations of this axiom. For example, guilt may lead the agent to prefer randomization,
a phenomenon inconsistent with independence. To see the point, consider a dieter in a
restaurant faced with a choice between a healthy dish and a tempting, unhealthy dish.
Independence implies that such a dieter would be indiﬀerent between this menu and one
which adds a randomization between the two. However, with such an option available,
the dieter can choose the lottery and have some chance of consuming the unhealthy dish
with less guilt than if it had been chosen directly. Hence the indiﬀerence required by
independence is not compelling.18
Also, there is a sense in which independence implies that the agent’s choices satisfy
a kind of “independence of irrelevant alternatives.” To understand this, note that we
represent the agent as if she would face cost function ci with probability qi. Subject to
the caveats mentioned in footnote 14, suppose we interpret the agent who faces menu x
as choosing some β which maximizes u(β)−ci(β,x) with probability qi. Substituting for
ci, this means that the agent maximizes a certain sum of utilities which is independent
of x. Hence if β is chosen over α from menu x, β is chosen over α from any menu, a kind
of IIA property. This conclusion is driven by the linearity of the representation — this
causes the maxβ∈x vj(β) terms to be irrelevant to the maxβ∈x u(β) − ci(β,x) expression.
This linearity comes from independence.
As Noor [2006b] suggests by example, this IIA property is not a compelling assump-
tion for temptation. For a diet–related version of his example, suppose the menu consists
only of broccoli and frozen yogurt. Arguably, the latter is not very tempting, so the agent
is able to stick to her diet and orders broccoli. However, if the menu consists of broccoli,
frozen yogurt, and an ice cream sundae, perhaps the agent is much more signiﬁcantly
tempted to order dessert and opts for the frozen yogurt as a compromise. See also the
related criticism of independence in Fudenberg and Levine [2005].
Related to the discussion of guilt two paragraphs above, issues of guilt and its ﬂip
side, feeings of “virtuousness,” may be important aspects of temptation and pose new
modeling challenges. To see the point, we again let b denote broccoli, y frozen yogurt, and
i ice cream and assume {b} { y} { i}. Suppose the agent knows she will choose y from
any menu containing it. Then it seems plausible that {y,i} { y} { b,y}.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
the ﬁrst preference comes about because the agent can feel virtuous by choosing frozen
yogurt over the more fattening ice cream, a feeling which the agent cannot get from
choosing yogurt when it is the only option. Similarly, the second preference reﬂects
the agent’s guilt from choosing frozen yogurt when broccoli was available, a feeling not
18We thank Phil Reny for suggesting this example. The example has a strong resemblance to the
“Machina’s mom” story in Machina [1989]. The resemblance suggests that the issue is more about
having preferences over procedures for decision making, perhaps driven by temptation, than about
temptation given otherwise standard preferences, the case we study here.
20generated by consuming frozen yogurt when there is no other option. Note that the ﬁrst of
these preferences contradicts our main axiom, DFC, since it implies {y,i} { y} { i}.
This story also runs contrary to the motivation for our AIC axiom: here, adding i
improves the menu {y} but does so because it is not chosen. While the preference
{b} { y} { b,y} is consistent with our general representation, it is not consistent with
a simple representation. In particular, with guilt, an agent who succumbs to temptation
does not avoid all costs. We suspect that an adequate treatment of these issues requires
moving beyond the class of ﬁnite additive EU representations.
21A Notational Conventions
Throughout the Appendix, we use u, vj, etc., to denote utility functions as well as
the vector giving the payoﬀs to the pure outcomes associated with the utility function.
When interpreted as vectors, they are column vectors. Let K denote the number of pure
outcomes, so these are K by 1. We write lotteries as 1 by K row vectors, so β ·u = u(β),
etc. Also, 1 denotes the K by 1 vector of 1’s.
B Existence of Finite Additive EU Representations
It is simpler to work with the following equivalent deﬁnition of a ﬁnite additive EU
representation.
Deﬁnition 5 A ﬁnite additive EU representation is a pair of ﬁnite sets S1 and S2 and


















The relevant axioms from DLR are:
Axiom 8 (Weak Order)   is asymmetric and negatively transitive.
Axiom 9 (Continuity) The strict upper and lower contour sets, {x  ⊆ Δ(B) | x    x}
and {x  ⊆ Δ(B) | x   x }, are open (in the Hausdorﬀ topology).
Given menus x and y and a number λ ∈ [0,1], let
λx +( 1− λ)y = {β ∈ Δ(B) | β = λβ
  +( 1− λ)β
  , for some β
  ∈ x,β
   ∈ y}
where, as usual, λβ +(1−λ)β   is the probability distribution over B giving b probability
λβ (b)+( 1− λ)β  (b).
22Axiom 10 (Independence) If x   x , then for all λ ∈ (0,1] and all ¯ x,
λx +( 1− λ)¯ x   λx
  +( 1− λ)¯ x.
We refer the reader to DLR for further discussion of these axioms.
The new axiom which will imply ﬁniteness requires a deﬁnition. Given any menu x,
let conv(x) denote its convex hull.
Deﬁnition 6 x  ⊆ conv(x) is critical for x if for all y with x  ⊆ conv(y) ⊆ conv(x),w e
have y ∼ x.
Intuitively, a critical subset of x contains all the “relevant” points in x.I ti se a s yt o
show that the three axioms above imply that the boundary of x is critical for x,s oe v e r y
set has at least one critical subset.
Axiom 11 (Finiteness) Every menu x has a ﬁnite critical subset.
Theorem 6   has a ﬁnite additive EU representation if and only if it satisﬁes weak
order, continuity, independence, and ﬁniteness.
Necessity is straightforward. The suﬃciency argument follows that of DLR and DLRS
by constructing an artiﬁcial “state space,” SK, then restricting it to a particular subset.





i =1 }. In line
with our notational conventions, we write elements of SK as K by 1 column vectors. For




As explained in DLR, our axioms imply that if σx = σx ,t h e nx ∼ x .
To prove suﬃciency, ﬁx any sphere, say x∗, in the interior of Δ(B). By ﬁniteness,
x∗ has a ﬁnite critical subset. Let xc denote such a subset. We claim that we may as
well assume xc is contained in the boundary of x∗. To see this, suppose it is not. For
every point in xc, associate any line through this point. Let ˆ xc denote the collection of
intersections of these lines with the boundary of x∗. Obviously, ˆ xc is ﬁnite. Also, it is
easy to see that conv(xc) ⊆ conv(ˆ xc). In light of this, consider any convex y ⊆ x∗ and
suppose ˆ xc ⊆ y.T h e n
xc ⊆ conv(xc) ⊆ conv(ˆ xc) ⊆ y ⊆ x
∗.
23So y ∼ x∗. Hence ˆ xc is a ﬁnite critical subset of x∗ which is contained in the boundary
of x∗. So without loss of generality, we assume xc is contained in the boundary of x∗.
Since x∗ is a sphere, there is a one–to–one mapping, say g, from the boundary of x∗
to SK where g(β)i st h es such that β is the unique maximizer of α · s over α ∈ x.T h a t
is, g(β)i st h es for which we have an indiﬀerence curve tangent to x∗ at β.L e t
S
∗ = g(xc)={s ∈ S





{α ∈ Δ(B) | α · g(β) ≤ β · g(β)}.
That is, x is the polytope bounded by the hyperplanes tangent to x∗ at the points in xc.
Lemma 3 xc is critical for x.
Proof. Obviously, xc ⊂ x. Fix any convex y such that xc ⊆ y ⊆ x. We show that y ∼ x.
To show this, ﬁx any ε>0a n dl e t
y












Note that xc ⊆ yε ⊆ y. Also, yε → y as ε ↓ 0s i n c exc ⊆ y ⊆ x.
We claim that




We establish this geometric property shortly. First, note that with this claim, the
proof of the lemma can be completed as follows. Fix any ε>0a n dλ ∈ (0,1) such that
λconv(xc)+( 1− λ)yε ⊆ x∗. Because xc ⊆ yε,w eh a v e
xc ⊆ λconv(xc)+( 1− λ)y
ε ⊆ x
∗.
Since xc is critical for x∗ and λconv(xc)+( 1− λ)yε is convex, this implies λconv(xc)+
(1 − λ)yε ∼ x∗.T h e f a c t t h a t xc is critical for x∗ also implies conv(xc) ∼ x∗. Hence
independence requires yε ∼ x∗. Since this is true for all ε>0, continuity implies y ∼ x∗.
24But this argument also works for the case of y = x,s ow es e et h a tx ∼ x∗. Hence y ∼ x,
so xc is critical for x.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 .First, note that it is suﬃcient to prove this for the case of y = x since
this makes the set on the left–hand side the largest possible. Next, note that it is then
suﬃcient to show that for every ε>0, there exists λ<1 such that every extreme point
of λconv(xc)+( 1− λ)xε is contained in x∗. Since each such extreme point must be a
convex combination of extreme points in xc and xε, this implies that a suﬃcient condition
is that there is a λ<1 such that for every α1 ∈ xc and α2 ∈ ext(xε), λα1+(1−λ)α2 ∈ x∗
where ext(·) denotes the set of extreme points. Since xε is a convex polyhedron, it has
ﬁnitely many extreme points. Also, xc is ﬁnite. Since there are ﬁnitely many α1 and
α2 to handle, it is suﬃcient to show that for every α1 ∈ xc and α2 ∈ ext(xε), there is a
λ ∈ (0,1) such that λα1 +( 1− λ)α2 ∈ x∗.
Equivalently, we show that for every α1 ∈ xc and α2 ∈ xε, there exists λ ∈ (0,1) such
that (λα1 +( 1− λ)α2) · s ≤ σx∗(s) for all s ∈ SK.T h a ti s ,
(1 − λ)(α2 · s − α1 · s) ≤ σx∗(s) − α1 · s, ∀s ∈ S
K. (3)
Since α1 ∈ x∗,w eh a v eσx∗(s) ≥ α1·s for all s ∈ SK. By construction, there is a unique s,
say ˆ s = g(α1), such that this inequality holds with equality. For all s  =ˆ s, σx∗(s) >α 1·s.
Also, by deﬁnition of xε, α2 ∈ xε implies that α2 · ˆ s ≤ α1 · ˆ s−ε. Hence for any λ ∈ [0,1],
equation (3) holds at s =ˆ s. For any s  =ˆ s,i fα2 · s ≤ α1 · s, again, equation (3) holds
for all λ ∈ [0,1]. Hence we can restrict attention to s such that α2 · s>α 1 · s and
σx∗(s) >α 1 · s. Given this restriction, it is clear that if α2 · s ≤ σx∗(s), again, equation
( 3 )h o l d sf o ra l lλ ∈ [0,1].
Let ˆ S = {s ∈ SK | α2 · s>σ x∗(s) >α 1 · s}. From the above, it is suﬃcient to show
the existence of a λ ∈ (0,1) satisfying equation (3) for all s ∈ ˆ S. A suﬃcient condition
for this is that there exists λ ∈ (0,1) such that
(1 − λ)(σΔ(B)(s) − α1 · s) ≤ σx∗(s) − α1 · s, ∀s ∈ ˆ S.
Obviously, σΔ(B)(s) − α1 · s is bounded from above. Hence it is suﬃcient to show that
the right–hand side of the inequality is bounded away from zero for s ∈ ˆ S.
To see that this must hold, suppose there is a sequence {sn} with sn ∈ ˆ S for all n
with σx∗(sn) − α1 · sn → 0. Clearly, this implies sn → ˆ s.B u tt h e n
lim
n→∞α2 · s
n = α2 · ˆ s ≤ σx∗(ˆ s) − ε = lim
n→∞σx∗(s
n) − ε,
implying that we cannot have sn ∈ ˆ S for all n, a contradiction. Hence such a λ must
exist.
25Lemma 4 If y is any set with σy(s)=σx(s) for all s ∈ S∗,t h e ny ∼ x.
Proof: Fix any such y. Without loss of generality, assume y is convex. (Otherwise,
we can replace y with its convex hull.) Clearly,
y ⊆{ β | β · s ≤ σx(s) ∀s ∈ S
∗}
since otherwise y would contain points giving it a higher value of the support function
for some s ∈ S∗. But the set on the right–hand side is x,s oy ⊆ x. Obviously, then if
xc ⊆ y,t h ef a c tt h a txc is critical for x implies y ∼ x.
So suppose xc  ⊆ y.A s n o t e d , w e m u s t h a v e y ⊆ x.S o l e t yλ = λx +( 1− λ)y.
Obviously, yλ converges to x as λ → 1. For each β ∈ xc, there is a face of the polyhedron
x such that β is in the (relative) interior of the face. Also, y must intersect the face of
the polyhedron and so yλ must intersect the face. As λ increases, the intersection of yλ
with the face enlarges as it is pulled out toward the boundaries of the face. Clearly, for
λ suﬃciently large, β will be contained in the intersection of yλ with the face of x which
contains β.T a k ea n yλ larger than the biggest such λ over the ﬁnitely many β ∈ xc.T h e n
xc ⊆ yλ ⊆ x.S i n c exc is critical for x, this implies λx +( 1− λ)y ∼ x. By independence,
then, y ∼ x.
Lemma 5 For any y and ˆ y such that σy(s)=σˆ y(s) for all s ∈ S∗, we have y ∼ ˆ y.





Because σy(s)=σˆ y(s) for all s ∈ S∗, it would be equivalent to use σˆ y instead of σy.L e t
zλ = {β ∈ Δ(B) | β · s ≤ uλ(s), ∀s ∈ S
∗}.
Obviously, λσy(s)+(1−λ)uλ(s)=σx(s) for all s ∈ S∗. This implies that for all λ ∈ (0,1),
λy +( 1− λ)zλ ⊆ x. To see this, note that for any α ∈ y and β ∈ zλ,
λα · s +( 1− λ)β · s ≤ λσy(s)+( 1− λ)uλ(s)=σx(s), ∀s ∈ S
∗.
But x = ∩s∈S∗{γ | γ · s ≤ σx(s)},s oλα +( 1− λ)β ∈ x.
Note also that uλ(s) → σx(s)a sλ ↓ 0. We claim that this implies that there is a
λ ∈ (0,1) such that for every s ∈ S∗, there exists β ∈ zλ with β · s = uλ(s). To see
26this, suppose it is not true. Then for all λ ∈ (0,1), there exists ˆ sλ ∈ S∗ such that for all
β ∈ zλ, β · ˆ sλ <u λ(ˆ sλ)s o
 
s∈S∗\{ˆ sλ}
{β | β · s ≤ uλ(s)} =
 
s∈S∗
{β | β · s ≤ uλ(s)}.
Because S∗ is ﬁnite, this implies that there exists ˆ s ∈ S∗, a sequence {λn} with λn ∈ (0,1)
for all n, λn → 0 such that for all n,
 
s∈S∗\{ˆ s}
{β | β · s ≤ uλn(s)} =
 
s∈S∗
{β | β · s ≤ uλn(s)}.
But uλn → σx as n →∞ . Hence the limit as n →∞of the right–hand side, namely x,
cannot equal the limit of the left–hand side, a contradiction.
Hence there is a λ ∈ (0,1) such that for every s ∈ S∗,t h e r ei saβ ∈ zλ with
β · s = uλ(s). Choose such a λ and let u = uλ and z = zλ. Obviously, for every s ∈ S∗,
there is α ∈ y with β · s = σy(s). Hence given our choice of λ, for every s ∈ S∗,t h e r ei s
γ ∈ λy+(1−λ)z such that γ·s = λσy(s)+(1−λ)u(s)=σx(s). Hence σλy+(1−λ)z(s)=σx(s)
for all s ∈ S∗. Hence Lemma 4 implies λy +( 1− λ)z ∼ x. The symmetric argument
with ˆ y replacing y implies λˆ y +( 1− λ)z ∼ x.S o λy +( 1− λ)z ∼ λˆ y +( 1− λ)z.B y
independence, then, y ∼ ˆ y.
DLR show that weak order, continuity, and independence imply the existence of a
function V : X → R which represents the preference and is aﬃne in the sense that
V (λx +( 1− λ)y)=λV (x)+( 1− λ)V (y). Fix such a V .L e t U = {(σx(s))s∈S∗ | x ∈
X}⊂RM where M is the cardinality of S∗.L e t σ|S∗ denote the restriction of σ to
S∗. Deﬁne a function W : U→R by W(U)=V (x) for any x such that σx|S∗ = U.
From Lemma 5, we see that if σx|S∗ = σx |S∗,t h e nx ∼ x  so V (x)=V (x ). Hence W
is well–deﬁned. It is easy to see that W is aﬃne and continuous and that U is closed,
convex, and contains the 0 vector. It is easy to show that W has a well–deﬁned extension
to a continuous, linear function on the linear span of U.S i n c eU is ﬁnite dimensional, W
has an extension to a continuous linear functional on RM. (See Lemma 6.13 in Aliprantis
and Border [1999], for example.) Since a linear function on a ﬁnite dimensional space












Hence we have a ﬁnite additive EU representation.
27C Proof of Theorem 3
The following lemma is critical.19
















j vj.S u p p o s e  satisﬁes DFC. Then there
are positive scalars ai, i =1 ,...,I,a n dbij, i =1 ,...,I, j =1 ,...,J and scalars ci,




i bij =1for all j and





Proof. Suppose not. Let Z denote the set of KI by 1 vectors (z 
1,...,z 
I)  such that
zi = aiu +
 
j
bijvj + ci1, ∀i
for scalars ai, bij,a n dci satisfying the conditions of the lemma. So if the lemma does not
hold, the vector (w 
1,...,w  
I)  / ∈ Z.S i n c eZ is obviously closed and convex, the separating





























Write p =( p1,...,p I)w h e r ee a c hpi i sa1b yK vector. So
 
i
pi · wi >
 
i















pi · wi >
 
i









19This result can be seen as a generalization of the Harsanyi aggregation theorem (Harsanyi [1955]).
See Weymark [1991] for an introduction to this literature.





for all j.S i n c eci is arbitrary in both sign and magnitude, we must have pi ·1 =0f o ra l l
i. If not, we could ﬁnd a ci which would violate the inequality above.
Also, for every choice of ai ≥ 0 such that
 
i ai =1 ,
max




with equality for an appropriately chosen (a1,...,a I). Similarly, for any non–negative
bij’s with
 
i bij =1 ,
max




with equality for an appropriately chosen (b1j,...,b Ij). Hence the inequality above im-
plies  
i
pi · wi > max




i pi · vj.
Write pi as (p1i,...,p Ki). Without loss of generality, we can assume that |pki|≤1/K
for all k and i. (Otherwise we could divide both sides of the inequality above by
K maxk,i |pki| and redeﬁne pi to have this property.) Let β denote the probability dis-
tribution (1/K,...,1/K). For each i,l e tαi = pi + β.N o t et h a t αki = pki +1 /K and
so αki ≥ 0 for all k, i. Also, αi · 1 = pi · 1 + β · 1 = 1. Hence each αi is a probability
distribution. Substituting αi − β for pi,
 
i
αi · wi −
 
i
β · wi > max








By deﬁnition of u,
 
i wi = u +
 
j vj. Hence this is
 
i




i αi · vj > max
i αi · u.








i αi · vj > max
i αi · u =m a x
α∈x u(α).
But this contradicts DFC.
We now prove Theorem 3. The necessity of   having a ﬁnite additive EU representa-
tion is obvious. For necessity of DFC, suppose   has a weak temptation representation.
For any menu x and any i =1 ,...,I ,l e tαi denote a maximizer of u(β)+
 
j∈Ji vj(β)


























29where the ﬁrst inequality uses ci(β,x) ≥ 0 for all i, β,a n dx and the last one uses qi > 0
and
 I 
i=1 qi = 1. Hence DFC must hold.
For suﬃciency, let V denote a ﬁnite additive EU representation of  . By Lemma 6,





















































i ci =0 .
Let I+ denote the set of i such that ai > 0. For each i ∈ I+,l e tqi = ai.L e t M
denote the number of (i,j)p a i r sf o rw h i c hbij > 0. For each such (i,j), let k(i,j)d e n o t e
a distinct element of {1,...,M}.F o re a c hi ∈ I+ and each j such that bij > 0, deﬁne a
utility function ˆ vk(i,j) =[ bij/ai]vj and let k(i,j) ∈ Ji.F o re a c hi/ ∈ I+ and each j with
bij > 0, deﬁne a utility function ˆ vk(i,j) = bijvj and let k(i,j) ∈ Ji.S of o ri ∈ I+,
wi = aiu +
 
j























































Hence V is a weak temptation representation.
30D Proof of Theorem 2
First, we show necessity. Obviously, if   has a temptation representation, it has a weak
temptation representation, so DFC and existence of a ﬁnite additive EU representation
are necessary. Hence the following lemma completes the proof of necessity.
Recall that
B(x)={α ∈ x |{ α} { α
 }, ∀α
  ∈ x}.
Lemma 7 If   has a temptation representation, then it satisﬁes AIC.
Fix   and a temptation representation, VT.L e tβ be an approximate improvement
for x.F i xa n yx  ⊆ x and α ∈ B(x ) such that {α} { β}.( I fn os u c hx, β, x ,a n dα
exist, AIC holds trivially.) By deﬁnition of an approximate improvement, there exists a
sequence βn converging to β such that x ∪{ βn} x for all n.


































Otherwise, all the maximized terms in the ﬁrst sum would be the same at z = x as at
z = x∪{βn}, while the terms being subtracted oﬀ must be at least as large at z = x∪{βn}
as at z = x.L e ti∗
n denote any such i. Because there are ﬁnitely many i’s, we can choose
a subsequence so that i∗
n is independent of n. Hence we can let i∗ = i∗









































j∈Ji∗ maxγ∈x ∪{β} vj(γ) from both sides to obtain
u(β) − ci∗(β,x
  ∪{ β}) ≥ max
γ∈x  [u(γ) − ci∗(γ,x
  ∪{ β})]
where ci∗ is the self–control cost for state i∗ from the temptation representation.
Recall that α ∈ B(x ) .H e n c ew eh a v e
VT(x  ∪{ β})=
 
i qi maxγ∈x ∪{β} [u(γ) − ci(γ,x  ∪{ β})]
= qi∗[u(β) − ci∗(β,x  ∪{ β})] +
 
i =i∗ qi maxγ∈x ∪{β} [u(γ) − ci(γ,x  ∪{ β})]
≤ qi∗[u(β) − ci∗(β,x  ∪{ β})] +
 
i =i∗ qi maxγ∈x ∪{β} u(γ)
= qi∗[u(β) − ci∗(β,x  ∪{ β})] + (1 − qi∗)u(α)
≤ qi∗u(β)+( 1− qi∗)u(α)
<u (α)
where the two weak inequalities follow from ci(γ,x  ∪{ β}) ≥ 0 and the strict inequality
follows from qi∗ > 0a n d{α} { β}. Hence {α} x  ∪{ β}, so AIC is satisﬁed.
Turning to suﬃciency, for the rest of this proof, let   denote a preference with a ﬁnite
additive EU representation V which satisﬁes DFC and AIC.
Before moving to the main part of the proof of suﬃciency, we get some special cases
out of the way. First, it is easy to see that if   has a ﬁnite additive EU representation,
then it has such a representation which is nonredundant in the sense that no wi or vj is a
constant function and no two of the wi’s and vj’s correspond to the same preference over
Δ(B). On the other hand, this nonredundant representation could have I =0 ,J =0 ,
or both. We ﬁrst handle these cases, then subsequently focus on the case where I ≥ 1,
J ≥ 1, no state is a constant preference, and no two states have the same preference over
lotteries.
If I = J = 0, the preference is trivial in the sense that x ∼ x  for all x and x .I nt h i s
case, the preference is obviously represented by the temptation representation












for an arbitrary constant A.L e t w1 denote a constant function equal to A and deﬁne
u = w1 −
 
j vj.T h e n











32giving a temptation representation. Finally, suppose J =0 . T os a t i s f yD F C ,w em u s t
then have I =1 ,s oV (x)=m a x β∈x w1(β)+A for an arbitrary constant A.L e tv1 be a
constant function equal to A and deﬁne u = w1 − v1. Then obviously





giving a temptation representation.
The remainder of the proof shows the result for the case where the ﬁnite additive EU
representation has I ≥ 1 positive states and J ≥ 1 negative states, none of which are
constant and no two of which correspond to the same preference over menus. Following
GP, we refer to this as a regular representation.
Recall that B(x)i st h es e to fα ∈ x such that {α} { α } for all α  ∈ x. Deﬁne a
menu x to be temptation–free if there is an α ∈ B(x) such that {α}∼x.













Fix any interior β and any x such that x ∪{ β} is temptation–free and β/ ∈ B(x ∪{ β}).
Then there is no i with
wi(β)= m a x
α∈x∪{β}
wi(α).
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose there is an interior β,a nx such that x∪{β} is temptation–
free and β/ ∈ B(x ∪{ β}), and an i with
wi(β)= m a x
α∈x∪{β}
wi(α).
Because β/ ∈ B(x ∪{ β}), we know that u(β) < maxα∈x u(α), where u is deﬁned by
u(γ)=V ({γ}) as usual. By hypothesis, the additive EU representation is regular so wi
is not constant. Because wi is not constant and β is interior, for any ε>0, we can ﬁnd a
ˆ β within an ε neighborhood of β such that wi(ˆ β) >w i(β). Hence wi(ˆ β) > maxα∈x wi(α).
Obviously, if ε is suﬃciently small, we will have u(ˆ β)c l o s et ou(β) and hence u(ˆ β) <
maxα∈x u(α).
Let ˆ J denote the set of j such that
max{vj(β),v j(ˆ β)} > max
α∈x vj(α).
For each j ∈ ˆ J, we can ﬁnd a γj such that vj(γj) >v j(β)a n dwi(γj) <w i(β). To see
that this must be possible, note that the selection of j implies that wi and −vj do not
33represent the same preference. By hypothesis, the additive EU representation is regular
so wi and vj do not represent the same preference and neither is constant. Hence the vj
indiﬀerence curve through β must have a nontrivial intersection with the wi indiﬀerence
curve through β. Hence such a γj must exist.
Let x  denote the collection of these γj’s. (If ˆ J = ∅,t h e nx  = ∅.) Let βλ =
λβ +( 1− λ)ˆ β. By construction, for all λ ∈ (0,1), wi ranks βλ strictly above any α ∈ x.
Also, since wi(β) >w i(γj) for all j,t h e r ei sa¯ λ ∈ (0,1) such that wi(βλ) >w i(γj)f o r
all j for all λ ∈ (¯ λ,1). Also, for every j/ ∈ ˆ J, vj ranks some point in x (and hence in
x  ∪x) at least weakly above both β and ˆ β and hence above βλ. Finally, for every j ∈ ˆ J,
vj(γj) >v j(β). Hence there is a ¯ λ  ∈ (0,1) such that vj(γj) >v j(βλ) for all j ∈ ˆ J and all














































  ∪ x).
Hence x  ∪ x∪{βλ} x  ∪x for all λ ∈ (λ∗,1). Since βλ → β as λ → 1, this implies β is
an approximate improvement for x  ∪ x. But then AIC implies that x ∪{ β} cannot be
temptation–free, a contradiction.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we use the following result from Rockafellar
[1970] (Theorem 22.2, pages 198–199):
Lemma 9 Let zi ∈ RN and Zi ∈ R for i =1 ,...,mand let   be an integer, 1 ≤   ≤ m.
Assume that the system zi · y ≤ Zi, i =   +1 ,...,m is consistent. Then one and only
one of the following alternatives holds:
(a) There exists a vector y such that
zi · y<Z i,i =1 ,..., 
34zi · y ≤ Zi,i =   +1 ,...,m
(b) There exist non–negative real numbers λ1,...,λ m such that at least one of the numbers







It is easy to use this result to show that if we have some equality constraints, we
simply drop the requirement that the corresponding λ’s are non–negative.
Fix   with a regular ﬁnite additive EU representation which satisﬁes DFC and AIC.











bij =1 , ∀j
−bij ≤ 0, ∀i,j
−ai < 0, ∀i.
Because DFC implies that a weak temptation representation exists, the part of the system
with only weak inequality constraints is obviously consistent. To state the alternatives
implied by the lemma in the most straightforward way possible, let λik denote the real





where k denotes the kth pure outcome. We use ¯ μ to correspond to the equation
 
i ai =1 ,
μj for the equation
 
i bij =1 ,ϕij for −bij ≤ 0, and ψi for −ai < 0. Hence Lemma 9
implies that either the ai’s, bij’s, and ci’s exists or there exists λik,¯ μ, μj, ϕij,a n dψi such
that
ϕij ≥ 0, ∀i,j
ψi ≥ 0, ∀i, strictly for some i
 
k
λiku(k)+¯ μ − ψi =0 ,i =1 ,...,I
35 
k
λikvj(k)+μj − ϕij =0 ,i =1 ,...,I;j =1 ,...,J
 
k









Assume, then, that no ai’s, bij’s, and ci’s exist satisfying the conditions postulated.
Then by Lemma 9, there must be a solution to this system of equations. Note that we
cannot have a solution to these equations with λik =0f o ra l li and k.T o s e e t h i s ,
note that the third equation would then imply ¯ μ = ψi for all i and hence ¯ μ>0. Also,
from the fourth equation, we would have μj = ϕij and hence μj ≥ 0 for all j.B u tt h e n
the last equation gives ¯ μ +
 
j μj ≤ 0, a contradiction. Since
 
k λik = 0, this implies
maxi,k λik > 0. Without loss of generality, then, we can assume that λik < 1/K for all i
and k. (Recall that there are K pure outcomes.) Otherwise, we can divide through all
e q u a t i o n sb y2 K maxi,k |λik| and redeﬁne all variables appropriately.
Rearranging the equations gives
 
k
λiku(k)+¯ μ = ψi ≥ 0, ∀i with strict inequality for some i
 
k









For each i, deﬁne an interior probability distribution αi by αi(k)=( 1 /K)−λik. Because





1. Letting β denote the probability distribution (1/K,...,1/K), we can rewrite the above
as
u(β)+¯ μ ≥ u(αi), ∀i with strict inequality for some i










The ﬁrst inequality implies
u(β)+¯ μ ≥ max
i u(αi)( 4 )











36Turning to the third inequality, recall that
 
i wi = u+
 










































i vj(αi) ≥ max
i u(αi). (6)








i vj(αi) ≥ max
i u(αi).








i vj(αi)=m a x
i u(αi).
Hence x is a temptation–free menu. Note that the ﬁrst equality in the last equation
implies that αi maximizes wi for all i. Also, the second equality together with equation
(6) implies that the weak inequalities in equations (4) and (5) must be equalities. In
particular, then,
u(β)+¯ μ =m a x
i u(αi).
However, recall that
u(β)+¯ μ ≥ u(αi), ∀i with strict inequality for some i
That is, there must be some k for which u(αk) < maxi u(αi). Hence x  = B(x). But αi
maximizes wi for every i, contradicting Lemma 8.
Hence there must exist such ai, bij,a n dci. It is easy to use the proof of Theorem 3
to complete the construction of a temptation representation.
E Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (Necessity.) We show that if   has a ﬁnite additive EU representation with only
one positive state and x   y,t h e nx   x ∪ y. It is not hard to see that























37When there is only one positive state, I = 1, so we can rewrite this as
V (x ∪ y)=m a x {maxβ∈x w1(β),maxβ∈y w1(β)}
−
 
j max{maxβ∈x vj(β),maxβ∈y vj(β)}.
Hence




















=m a x {V (x),V(y)} = V (x).
Hence x   x ∪ y.
(Suﬃciency.) Suppose   has a ﬁnite additive EU representation and satisﬁes positive
set betweenness. Assume, contrary to our claim, that this representation has more than












where I ≥ 2. Without loss of generality, we can assume that w1 and w2 represent diﬀerent
preferences over Δ(B) — otherwise, we can rewrite the representation to combine these
two states into one. Let ˆ x denote a sphere in the interior of Δ(B). Let
x =
  I  
i=1
















Because ˆ x is a sphere and because I and J are ﬁnite, there must be a wi indiﬀerence
curve which makes up part of the boundary of x for i =1 ,2. Fix a small ε>0. For
i =1 ,2a n dk =1 ,...,I,l e tεi
k =0f o rk  = i and εi
i = ε. Finally, for i =1 ,2, let yi equal
  I  
k=1
{β ∈ Δ(B) | wk(β) ≤ max
β ∈ˆ x
wk(β

































Hence x   yi, i =1 ,2. Hence y1 ∪ y2   yi, i =1 ,2, contradicting positive set between-
ness.
38F Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Necessity is obvious. For suﬃciency, assume   has a ﬁnite additive EU represen-
tation and satisﬁes DFC and negative set betweenness. We know from Lemma 2 that it
has only one negative state. Using this and Lemma 6, we see that   can be represented













i bi = 1. (The argument in the proof of
Theorem 3 showing that
 
i ci = 0 applies here as well.)
We can assume without loss of generality that ai > 0 for all i. To see this, suppose





β∈x [aiu(β)+biv(β)] − max
β∈x (1 − b1)v(β).
If b1 =1 ,t h e nbi =0f o ra l li  = 1. Because a1 =0a n d
 
i ai =1 ,w et h e nh a v e
V (x)=m a x β∈x u(β). This is a VUS representation with I =1a n dγ1 = 0. So suppose
b1 < 1. Let ˆ v =( 1−b1)v and for i =2 ,...,I,l e tˆ bi = bi/(1−b1). Note that
 I
i=2ˆ bi =1 .






[aiu(β)+ˆ biˆ v(β)] − max
β∈x
ˆ v(β).
Continuing as needed, we eliminate every i with ai =0 .
Given that ai > 0 for all i,l e tqi = ai and let γi = bi/ai. With this change of notation,
V can be rewritten in the form of VUS.
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